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INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis is the worst the United States has faced since the
Great Depression.' As the crisis gradually evolved from a mere housing bubble
into a severe recession, the government's response evolved as, well, culminating
in the well-known Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Established by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA),2 this unprecedented program
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase up to $70o billion in assets
and securities from financial institutions in order to stabilize the nation's finan-
cial markets. But however necessary it may have been to avert a crisis, EESA's
extremely broad delegation of authority, vague statutory commands, and weak
provisions on judicial review raised the possibility of unaccountable administra-
tive governance on a massive scale.
That possibility has helped to make TARP deeply unpopular. The public
debate has generally characterized TARP as a $700 billion blank check, which
the Treasury Department then essentially signed over to the banking industry.'
Even worse, the program's very purpose was to rescue banks from a crisis that
they themselves had created in the first place. Popular antipathy toward TARP
was most palpable in March 2009 during the popular uproar over the large bo-
nuses paid to employees at American Insurance Group (AIG), which received
billions of dollars in taxpayer aid even as unemployment climbed into the
double digits. But the underlying sentiment predated that incident and has long
outlasted it. The AIG bonus scandal simply crystallized a larger narrative in
which the Treasury administered TARP so as to save the banks while allowing
ordinary citizens to continue to suffer. This narrative has some basis in fact,
since, as a mechanism to save failing banks from their own mistakes using pub-
lic funds, TARP necessarily involved a level of raw unfairness. Popular con-
sciousness has blamed that unfairness on Congress for delegating such an
enormous amount of power to the Treasury, and on the Treasury for allegedly
using that power to the exclusive benefit of banks.
The legal literature on TARP is remarkably small, but to the extent that le-
gal scholars have written about TARP, they have taken a similarly dim view of
the program.4 Gary Lawson, for example, argues that EESA delegated such un-
1. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM
2 (2oog), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-o12909-report-
regulatoryrefoim.pdf.
2. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
3. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
4. Aside from the few pieces of scholarship described, see infra notes 5-12, the legal
literature on TARP has focused narrowly on the executive cdmpensation regula-
tions that EESA imposes on financial firms that take certain forms of TARP mon-
ey. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98




fettered power to the Treasury that it exceeded Congress's enumerated powers
and runs afoul of the non-delegation doctrine,' the rarely invoked legal me-
chanism by which the Supreme Court prevents Congress from surrendering its
lawmaking powers to executive agencies.6 Lawson also claims that EESA so
drastically altered the Treasury Secretary's official responsibilities that it also vi-
olates the Appointments Clause! A number of student notes also argue that
EESA and TARP violate the non-delegation doctrine or are otherwise repug-
nant to the Constitution.
tion regulation); Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Con-
tract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94
MINN. L. Rev. 368 (2009) (examining one type of restriction on executive com-
pensation contained in EESA); Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive
Compensation, and the Obama Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491 (2010) (assessing the likely
impact of the amendments to EESA pertaining to executive compensation in the
stimulus bill); Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed
Securities, Federal Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake- Up Call for
Reforming Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 131 (2009) (arguing that the
executive compensation reforms in EESA and the stimulus bill are welcome but
inadequate); Michael diFilipo, Note, Regulating Executive Compensation in the
Wake of the Financial Crisis, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 258 (2009) (arguing that the execu-
tive compensation reforms in EESA and the stimulus bill will not reduce compen-
sation or fix the skewed incentives that contributed to the crisis). One additional
article has focused not on executive compensation, but on the Capital Purchase
Program's (CPP) potential to further fragment and complicate federal banking
regulation. See Jackie Prester, When the Government Becomes a Stockholder: Impact
of the Capital Purchase Program on Bank Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 931
(2009).
5. Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUa. POL'Y
55 (2oo).
6. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down a provision of the
National Industrial Recovery Act that empowers the president to bar certain oil
products from being imported into the United States as an improper delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 295 U.S. 495 (1933) (striking down a provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act empowering the president to give industry codes of fair competition
the force of law as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority); see also
The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining the non-delegation doctrine).
7. Lawson, supra note 5, at 67-69.
8. See, e.g., Steven Pearse, Note, Accounting for the Lack of Accountability: The Great
Depression Meets the Great Recession, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 409, 421-22 (2010)
(arguing that EESA violates the non-delegation doctrine); David T. Riley, Note,
Roll Up the Constitution and Unfurl the TARP: How Spending Conditions in the
Troubled Asset Relief Program Violate the Constitution, 98 Ky. L.J. 595, 616-20
(2010) (arguing that EESA's limitations on judicial review are unconstitutional).
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Most notably, however, scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have ar-
gued that EESA is emblematic of a larger pattern in the modern administrative
state-namely, that unchecked executive power is an all but inevitable feature
of crisis governance.9 Drawing on the work of German political theorist Carl
Schmitt, Posner and Vermeule maintain that Congress, because of its limited
expertise and access to information,o and the courts, because of their limited
political legitimacy," are institutionally incapable of constraining the Executive
in a crisis. These scholars conclude, therefore, that raw politics will represent
the only real restraint on executive power under such circumstances. Accord-
ing to this view, Congress through EESA not only essentially empowered the
Treasury to do whatever it took to end the financial crisis, limited primarily by
its judgment as to what was the best policy and what might provoke a political
backlash, but no reasonable observer should have expected Congress to do oth-
erwise. Posner and Vermeule present their argument as a purely descriptive the-
sis rather than a critique of TARP, but their vision of a program administered
by unchecked executive power is not normatively attractive in a legal culture
that prizes the separation of powers.
In order to assess the validity of this popular and scholarly consensus that
TARP represents a paradigmatic case of the modern administrative state run
amuck, this Note analyzes how the Treasury Department and other administra-
tive agencies have actually administered the first and largest sub-program estab-
lished under TARP, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)." Through the CPP,
the Treasury made $204.9 billion in capital injections into 707 banks and finan-
cial institutions between October of 2008 and December of 2009.14 The struc-
ture of the CPP involved voluntary transactions between the government and
banks, thus representing a variation on the theme of "regulation by deal" that
dominated the first few years of the government's response to the financial cri-
9. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/1 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1636 (2009).
("(W~e argue that the conditions of the administrative state make it practically in-
evitable that the executive and the agencies will be the main crisis managers, with
legislatures and courts reduced to adjusting the government's response at the
margins and carping from the sidelines.").
10. Id. at 1643.
II. Id. at 1654.
12. Id. at 1679.
13. As of this writing, TARP encompasses thirteen separate sub-programs. OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM he-
reinafter SIGTARP], QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JULY 21, 2010, at 8 (2010)
[hereinafter SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/
reports/congress/2010/JulyzotoQuarterlyReporttoCongress.pdf.




sis." In contrast to the ad hoc succession of government bailouts that preceded
TARP, however, the CPP reflected an effort to structure a comprehensive and
systematic set of transactions to deal with the crisis.
The administration of the CPP has not been without its flaws, but its critics'
worst fears of captured bureaucrats constrained only by brute political expe-
diency have not come to pass.' The constraints the program has imposed on
banks are consistent with basic rule-of-law requirements-they are stable, con-
sistent, general in application, and have been announced in advance of en-
forcement. Moreover, the CPP has succeeded in injecting capital into the bank-
ing system quickly, and the Congressional Budget Office projects that by the
time the program is fully unwound it will actually make taxpayers $2 billion in
profits. 7 The program has done this while maintaining transparent operations
that enable political oversight by elected officials and the public. The CPP has
thus generally operated in a manner consistent with the three basic goals of any
administrative regime: effective administration, protection of the legal rights of
regulated entities, and facilitation of democratic control. 8
Administrative law scholars and practitioners generally assume that statu-
tory specificity and judicial review are the primary mechanisms through which
administrators are held to account, but both of these features were largely ab-
sent from the CPP.9 I therefore explain the CPP's success as the result of two
alternative mechanisms of administrative accountability-managerial accoun-
tability mechanisms and market-based accountability mechanisms. In the face
of a nearly standardless statute and non-existent judicial review, these alterna-
tive accountability mechanisms sufficed to deliver responsible, public-regarding
15. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Re-
sponse to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463, 466 (2009).
16. The arguments in this Note are limited to the CPP; I make no claims about other
TARP sub-programs, which are structured and administered differently than the
CPP. For other TARP programs, particularly the Home Affordable Modification
Program, critics' charges of captured administration may be more accurate. See
SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 ("[The Home Affordable Modifi-
cation Program) continues to struggle to achieve its original stated objective, to
help millions of homeowners avoid foreclosure .... ).
17. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASsET RELIEF PROGRAM-
MARCH 2010, at 2 (20o), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/n2xx/docu227/
03-17-TARP.pdf.
18. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Founda-
tions, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263-64 (2006) (describing the aspiration of
administrative law as the search for "institutional designs that appropriately bal-
ance the simultaneous demands of political responsiveness, efficient administra-
tion, and respect for legal rights").
19. See id. at 1258 (describing as one of the two "governing myths" of administrative
law that "administrative law is the law of judicial review of administrative action.
On this view, to the extent that law holds administration accountable, it is law in
courts that counts.").
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administrative governance beyond what politics alone could produce, even in
the midst of crisis. Indeed, contrary to the arguments of Posner and Vermeule,
to the extent that politics dictated any of the administrative details, it made the
program worse rather than better. Alternative accountability mechanisms made
the CPP an administrative success primarily because the structure of the pro-
gram and the surrounding political environment aligned the administrative
goals of efficiency, rights protection, and democratic oversight. For that reason,
managerial and market-based accountability mechanisms-usually imple-
mented to promote administrative effectiveness-in practice operated to pro-
mote rights protection and democratic oversight as well. This explanation for
the CPP's successful implementation has immediate relevance for ongoing poli-
cy debates regarding the Treasury's newly created Community Development
Capital Initiative and the recently enacted Small Business Lending Fund, pro-
grams that are both modeled on the CPP.20 More broadly, the CPP illustrates
the power of alternative mechanisms of administrative accountability and the
importance of the degree of alignment among different administrative goals,
which have implications for crisis governance and the study of administrative
law in general.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the popular and scholarly cri-
tiques of TARP and provides a theoretical framework for understanding the
role that managerial and market-based accountability mechanisms play in ad-
ministrative governance. Part II lays out the background of the crisis and the
haphazard and improvisational nature of the government's initial response.
Part fI chronicles the passage of EESA and the establishment of the CPP. Part
IV analyzes how the Treasury Department has managed each of the various de-
cisions it must make in the life of a bank's participation in the CPP. Part V as-
sesses the manner in which the Treasury and other agencies have administered
the CPP.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Popular and Scholarly Critiques of TARP
TARP has been an extremely unpopular program, in large part because the
public believes that it has been administered irresponsibly. In the words of a re-
port by the Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP),
Notwithstanding TARP's role in bringing the financial system back
from the brink of collapse, it has been widely reported that the Ameri-
can people view TARP with anger, cynicism, and distrust... . [Many
Americans believe] that TARP funds went into a "black hole"; that
TARP was created in secrecy to transfer wealth from taxpayers to Wall
20. Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2o1o, Pub. L. No. 111-240 §§ 4101-4113




Street insiders (exacerbated by the announcement of billions of dollars
of profits and record-setting bonus pools at TARP recipients while un-
employment and foreclosures continue to rise); or that Treasury is just
too closely aligned with the interests of Wall Street . . . "
The program was born in a quintessential crisis atmosphere, with the Treasury
Department requesting enormous resources and nearly unfettered discretion
while insisting that there was no time for congressional hearings or extended
debate. One Congressman described the legislative debate as a hostage-taking,
analogizing Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's initial legislative proposal to a
"ransom note" for "$700 billion in unmarked bills."" When the program was
up and running, the Congressional Oversight Panel sharply criticized the Trea-
sury's refusal to require banks receiving TARP funds to keep track of what they
did with the money, which fed into a widespread claim that the government
does not even know where the public funds spent through TARP have gone. 3
The public's resentment and frustration with the Treasury's allegedly lax
management of taxpayer funds was perhaps most evident in the controversy
surrounding the bonuses paid at insurance giant AIG. In March 2009, AIG, re-
cipient of $170 billion in emergency taxpayer aid, announced that it would pay
$165 million in extra compensation to employees in its financial services divi-
sion, the division responsible for the transactions that had nearly brought down
the company.24 The announcement prompted an outpouring of populist out-
rage directed at both AIG and TARP, and politicians outdid each other in de-
nouncing the bonuses. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, 5 despite quickly
21. SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 21, 2009, at 4
(2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2oop/October2009
QuarterlyReporttoCongress.pdf.
22. Kathy Kiely & Sue Kirchhoff, Leaders Back Historic Bailout; "Now We Have To Get
the Votes", USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2oo8, at AL.
23. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RE-
LIEF PROGRAM 3 (2oo), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
010909-report.pdf ("The Panel still does not know what the banks are doing with
taxpayer money . ... The recent refusal of certain private financial institutions to
provide any accounting of how they are using taxpayer money undermines public
confidence."). In a widely distributed clip from his movie "Capitalism: A Love
Story," Michael Moore interviewed Elizabeth Warren, Chair of the Congressional
Oversight Panel, and asked her the following question: "Where is the $700 billion
of bailout money which Congress gave to the big banks and Wall Street invest-
ment companies?" Warren replied simply, "I don't know." CAPITALISM: A LOVE
STORY (Overture Films 2009).
24. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At AIG, Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion Bai-
lout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/
03/15/business/i5AIG.html.
25. Geithner succeeded Paulson as Treasury Secretary after Obama's inauguration
as president. See Jackie Calmes, Geithner Wins Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES,
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condemning the bonuses and taking steps to recoup them, received withering
criticism," and Senator Chris Dodd, who had inserted the critical language in
EESA, suffered a huge political backlash and eventually decided not to seek ree-
lection." The political uproar eventually subsided, but the unfavorable percep-
tion of the government's handling of TARP funds has persisted.
To the extent that they have commented on the program, legal scholars
have also taken a negative view of TARP's conformity with the basic require-
ments of democracy and the rule of law. Several observers have suggested that
the program runs afoul of the non-delegation doctrine and other constitutional
constraints," but the most influential scholarly critique thus far has been that of
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule2 9 These scholars argue not only that EESA
delegated an enormous amount of nearly unfettered authority to the Treasury
Secretary, but more generally that unchecked executive power is an all but in-
evitable result of the institutional and political dynamics of crisis governance.
The dynamic they describe proceeds as follows. First, an externally precipitated
crisis creates strong political demand for government action. Accordingly, the
Executive seeks new statutory authority from Congress.30 Congress, however,
knows relatively little about the true nature and extent of the crisis, since rele-
vant expertise and accurate information rest with executive branch administra-
tors and the private actors they regulate." Moreover, the ongoing emergency
raises the opportunity cost of continued deliberation, leading Congress ulti-
mately to enact a statute with few constraints on the Executive.? This enables
the Executive to act and insulates members of Congress from any charge that
they left the government shackled in a crisis.?3 The courts, meanwhile, to the ex-
tent they even have authority to exercise review, generally can only do so after
the fact. Moreover, they generally have even less information and expertise than
Jan. 27, 2009, at A2o, available at http://query.nytimes.comfgstifulipage.html?res=
9906E5DC1238F934A15752CoA96F 9 C8B63.
26. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Laura Litvan, Geithner Vows To Recoup AIG Bonuses as
Lawmakers Express Fury, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?sid=aTbsRunotbQpid=2o6o108 7.
27. Adam Nagourney, Dodd is Said To Decide Against Re-Election Bid, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 201o, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2o10/oi/o6/us/politics/
o6dodd.html.
28. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
29. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9.
30. Id. at 1638-39.
31. Id. at 1643-45.
32. Id. at 1646-47.




Congress, and rarely possess the political legitimacy to second-guess the Execu-
tive's response to the crisis.34
The result of this dynamic, according to Posner and Vermeule, is that in a
crisis, "politics, rather than law, will place limits on [the Executive's] actions.""
They claim that this result accords with the Weimar political theorist Carl
Schmitt's view that "liberal lawmaking institutions, such as legislatures and
courts, 'come too late' to crises in the modern state," and therefore are simply
incapable of contributing much to contemporary crisis governance 6 Posner
and Vermeule frame their analysis as a mere empirical description of the go-
verning capacities of the three branches of government rather than any kind of
normative endorsement or critique." But the implications of their vision are
quite unsettling. An executive branch unchecked by the legislature or the judi-
ciary and constrained only by its own political calculations is at odds with basic
assumptions of administrative law, fundamental principles of the separation of
powers, and, ultimately, the rule of law.
B. Alternative Accountability Mechanisms
Posner and Vermeule's analysis, non-delegation-based constitutional criti-
ques of EESA, and, to a large extent, the more inchoate popular frustration at
the Treasury's management of TARP, share an assumption that accountable
administrative governance based on the rule of law flows from two basic
sources: statutory specificity and judicial review. Where there are no detailed
statutory provisions by which courts can hold agencies to the rule of law, what
is left, in Posner and Vermeule's view, is the rule of politics, or, in the general
popular view, the rule of irresponsible, captured bureaucrats. This assumption
accords with the widespread belief among administrative lawyers that "to the
extent that law holds administration accountable, it is law in courts that
counts."3" But if Posner and Vermeule are right about the institutional con-
straints that Congress and the courts face during crises, then this widely shared
assumption implies that accountable crisis governance is basically infeasible. If
politics provides the only reliable constraint on executive discretion in a crisis,
there will be wide room for arbitrary, capricious, inconsistent, and otherwise
lawless administrative action.
Fortunately, however, there are other sources of administrative accounta-
bility beyond statutory specificity and judicial review. Of particular importance
34. Id. at 1654-59.
35. Id. at 1679.
36. Id. at 1640-41.
37. Id. at 1636 ("Ought implies can: before asking what authority institutions ought to
have to manage crises, we must ask what their capacities are, and what allocations
of authority are feasible given those capacities.").
38. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1258.
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to this study of the CPP are managerial accountability mechanisms and market-
based accountability mechanisms. The first of these-managerial accountability
mechanisms-is a long-recognized but often forgotten element of administra-
tive law. As early as 1905, Professor Frank Goodnow highlighted the important
role that the internal structure and hierarchy of government agencies play in
promoting administrative efficiency. 9 More recently, Professor Jerry Mashaw
has explained that these mechanisms can also promote the goals of protecting
individual legal rights and facilitating democratic oversighto4
The critical insight underlying managerial accountability mechanisms is
that administrative agencies are not monolithic, unitary actors, but rather col-
lective organizations composed of superior and inferior agencies and officials.
Superior officials transmit directions to subordinates as to how they should ex-
ercise their discretion and then hold those subordinates to account through hir-
ing and firing, performance reviews, control over the allocation of privileges
and duties, and other managerial techniques. This is not to claim that agency
heads have dictatorial power-inferior officers can of course resist some orders
from above, and in the end, lines of authority are negotiated rather than im-
posed. The point, rather, is that in asserting and maintaining what hierarchical
control they do have, superior officials limit the discretion of individual inferior
officers and push them to make decisions in accord with the agency's overall
policies and guidelines. This managerial imperative, even under conditions of
crisis, can help to produce administration governed by consistent, general, im-
personal norms-that is, administration consistent with the basic requirements
of the rule of law. That is a feat that politics alone often cannot achieve.
Market-based accountability mechanisms-the second important type of
alternative accountability mechanism in this Note-are not a pervasive feature
of administrative law, but where an administrative regime involves numerous
voluntary transactions, they become quite relevant. In market-based accounta-
bility mechanisms, producers and consumers attempt to satisfy each others'
preferences through consensual exchanges, and they hold each other accounta-
ble by negotiating new terms for those exchanges, or, at the extreme, by refusing
to make any exchanges at all. Thus, when a government agency undertakes a
market transaction, the agency can be held to account by the counterparty's
ability (i) simply to walk away, and (2) to bargain for more favorable terms by
threatening to walk away. When the agency undertakes a series of transactions,
the agency is also constrained by (3) the effect that its current conduct will have
on potential future counterparties' perceptions, creating an incentive for hones-
ty and fair dealing. Where relevant, these forces can produce a measure of re-
sponsible administration beyond what politics alone can produce.41
39. FRANK J. GooDNow, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 371-72 (1905).
40. Mashaw, supra note 18, at 1264-65.
41. A third source of accountability is that produced through social networks; mem-




The central claim of this Note is that, in the absence of any significant sta-
tutory constraints or meaningful judicial review, the success of the CPP demon-
strates that alternative accountability mechanisms can produce responsible,
public-regarding administration even in the midst of a crisis. To be sure, mana-
gerial and market-based mechanisms will not always be enough to deliver ac-
countable administrative governance on their own. Statutory specificity and
judicial review also matter; in fact, they are likely to be critical in programs that
are under less public scrutiny than the CPP and where the values of effective-
ness, rights protection, and democratic oversight are not so closely aligned as
they were in the CPP. The CPP is a unique program administered under unique
circumstances, but at the very least, its success shows that where a politically
important and closely watched program is structured to align the basic goals of
administrative governance, alternative accountability mechanisms can make all
the difference.
At a more general level, this Note is a reminder that statutory specificity
and judicial review co-exist with other accountability mechanisms. What that
means is that the absence of any one mechanism does not necessarily imply that
the administrative state will run rampant. Contrary to the assumption of Posner
and Vermeule, non-delegation critics, and the general public, the administra-
tion of the CPP shows that the rule of law in the modern administrative state
does not depend solely on detailed statutes and attentive courts but also on the
structure of the programs and the agencies in question.
I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS AND THE INITIAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TARP and the CPP were established at a turning point in the U.S. govern-
ment's response to the financial crisis. That crisis began as a bubble in the U.S.
housing market. Between the beginning of 2001 and the middle of 2o06, hous-
ing prices grew at an unsustainable rate of nearly twelve percent per year,42 and
consumers, home-builders, mortgage underwriters, and, most importantly,
large financial institutions, came to assume that home prices would continue to
rise forever. When the bubble finally burst in May of 2006, prices initially fell
adherence to internally generated norms. Social accountability mechanisms can
be quite important in administrative governance, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring
a "Dense Complexity": Accountability and the Project ofAdministrative Law, ISSUES
IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2005, at 24-26, 36, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4,
but their effects on a given administrative regime are difficult to discern without a
level of close anthropological study that is beyond the scope of this Note.
42. See Standard & Poor's, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices-Instrument: Seaso-
nally Adjusted Composite 2o Index, www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/
SACSHomePriceHistory o92955.xls, cited in CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DE-
cEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 8 n.i (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov
documents/cop-120909-report. pdf.
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only slightly, dropping just three percent in the next year, 43 but that was enough
to send the vulnerable subprime mortgage market into panic. By 2007, major
subprime lenders were battling rising default rates, and by June of that year, rat-
ings agencies were furiously downgrading their evaluations of securities backed
by subprime mortgages." Ratings downgrades caused the crisis to spread from
the housing market into the broader credit and equity markets, prompting a
government response.45 The government stepped in with classic macroeconom-
ic remedies: the Federal Reserve steadily lowered interest rates,46 and Congress
provided soo billion in fiscal stimulus in the form of tax cuts.47 By the fall of
2007, the stock market had recovered, and credit markets had calmed.48
Housing prices, however, continued to decline, forcing financial institu-
tions exposed to the housing market to take large write-downs and undertake
massive recapitalization efforts. But new equity could not neutralize the huge
quantities of non-performing securities backed by the mortgage market on
banks' balance sheets. By March of 2008, non-performing assets caused Bear
Stearns, then one of the five largest Wall Street investment banks, to totter to-
wards insolvency, leading to a run on the bank.49 Massive write-downs caused
Bear Stearns's investors to lose confidence and pull their money out, which in
turn led the bank's counterparties to demand the posting of collateral. Collater-
al calls raised the bank's borrowing costs and weakened it further, causing even
more investors to lose confidence, resulting in a vicious cycle."o
Unwilling to watch a systemically important firm" fail and go through a
chaotic bankruptcy, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve kicked off the next
43, Id.
44. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK:
WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 9 (2009) [herei-
nafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER 2009 REPORT], available at
http://cop
.senate.gov/documents/cop-1209o9-report.pdf.
45. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 471.
46. See FED. RESERVE BD., OPEN MARKET OPERATIONs (2008), http://www
.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm; FED. RESERVE DIScOuNT WINDOW, His-
TORICAL DISCOUNT RATES: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CREDIT (2008),
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/primarysecondary.xs.
47. Economic Stimulus Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008).
48. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 472.
49. See Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008,
at 86, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd
_bear.fortune/.
50. See id.
51. Though it was the smallest of the top five Wall Street investment banks, Bear
Stearns was extremely interconnected to the rest of the financial system. See




phase of the government's response to the crisis by crafting an ad hoc bailout.
These agencies stretched their statutory powers-and likely broke Delaware
corporations law-by arranging for JP Morgan to acquire Bear Steams." The
Federal Reserve then lowered interest rates even further 3 and increased its lend-
ing. 4 Congress, for its part, passed a bill extending aid to subprime borrowers
and increasing the Treasury's powers over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in case
they should become insolvent.15 The relatively small scale of this response, how-
ever, indicates that the relevant government actors basically hoped that this first
bailout would be enough to solve the problem.
But important financial institutions continued to fail. July 2008 saw the
second-largest bank failure in U.S. history,5' and in early September, the Trea-
sury took both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. Despite
these additional bailouts, credit markets continued to seize up, and by mid-
September, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were entering the same vicious
cycle that had brought down Bear Stearns. Merrill managed to negotiate a pri-
vate bailout by Bank of America, but Lehman's attempt to reach a similar deal
with Barclay's fell through when Barclay's U.K. regulator balked.17 That left no
one to turn to but the U.S. government. In this case, however, the government
refused to intervene, forcing Lehman to file for bankruptcy. Secretary Paulson
has maintained that the reason for this decision was that the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve "didn't have the powers" to act.5' But given that the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve had previously engineered a bailout of the similarly si-
tuated Bear Stearns, this explanation is not credible. The more plausible expla-
nation is that Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, alarmed by
the growing list of government bailouts, wanted to fight the problem of moral
tions, I CAP. MRKT. PERSP. 2 (2009), available at http://www.ksri.org/publishl
down_nornember.asp?idx=416.
52. See id. at 476-83 (arguing that several deal-protection devices in JP Morgan's take-
over of Bear Stearns violated a number of Delaware doctrines governing mergers
and acquisitions).
53. See supra sources cited in note 46.
54. The Federal Reserve opened its discount window beyond the banks it oversees to
all seventeen institutions that are "primary dealers" in federal government securi-
ties. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Fre-
quently Asked Questions (June 25, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
pdcf~faq.htmi.
55. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(2008).
56. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 485.
57. Id. at 491-92.
58. Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Ai, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/
business/economy/23paulson.html.
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hazard with a dose of austerity. Bailouts are, after all, a form of taxpayer-funded
insurance, which encourages banks to take on excessive risks. The Treasury and
the Federal Reserve thus acted to show banks that they could not simply assume
that the government would always come to the rescue, forcinf)anks to self-
insure?9
But as more systemically important institutions continued to fail, this
tough-love policy quickly became untenable. Just one day after Lehman filed for
bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve extended an emergency loan to AIG, which had
become insolvent the day before.o Even so, credit markets remained panicked,
and the interbank lending rate-a key indicator of banks' confidence in one
another-spiked.' The panic began to reach even traditionally safe and staid
corners of the financial world when a venerable money-market fund "broke the
buck," setting off the beginnings of a run on the money-market industry."
Since U.S. corporations rely on money-market funds for working capital, in-
cluding funding for making payroll, this was a particularly grim development.
The Treasury stepped in yet again, this time relying on obscure language from
an old Depression-era statute that had been enacted for the entirely obsolete
purpose of stabilizing exchange rates through gold market transactions."* Fur-
ther bailouts continued even while Congress debated a more comprehensive
approach to the crisis; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
seized and resold the deposits of one large consumer bank, Washington Mutual,
and forced the sale of another, Wachovia. 64 With the list of failing firms saved
by ad hoc government bailouts continuing to mount, it became clear that fi-
nancial markets would not fix themselves and that a more holistic plan would
be necessary.
III. THE PASSAGE OF EESA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CPP
A. The Passage and Structure of EESA
By the fall of 2008, the government's initial response to the financial crisis
had proven ineffectual. An improvisational approach had required the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve to chase the panic as it ran through the financial system
and to stretch their statutory powers at each stage in order to craft an ad hoc
59. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 493-94.
6o. Id. at 495.
61. LIBOR Rates: Historical Charts, http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor-rates_
history-chart-graph.htm (last visited Oct. 17, zoo).
62. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 505-o6.
63. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program
for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/
hpil47.htm.




bailout. Moreover, no discernible ex ante standards governed what firms, like
Bear Stearns, the government would rescue, and what firms, like Lehman
Brothers, it would allow to fail. A comprehensive approach authorized by Con-
gress, on the other hand, held the potential to enable a systematic response that
could calm markets generally and legitimate the government's extraordinary
interventions. So, on September 20, zoo8, Secretary Paulson proposed the
enactment of a very brief-three-page, 849-word-bill that would have given
the Treasury Secretary the unreviewable authority to purchase up to $700 bil-
lion in mortgage-related assets with taxpayer money." The bill would also have
authorized the Secretary "to take such actions as the Secretary deems necessary
to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation," hiring
employees and financial agents, entering into contracts, setting up vehicles, and
issuing regulations and guidance." This "without limitation" language seemed
to indicate that the only constraints the bill placed on the Secretary's authority
were (i) the $700 billion cap on the amount of obligations that could be out-
standing at one time, (2) a two-year sunset provision, (3) a requirement that the
Secretary report back to Congress, and (4) a vague exhortation that the Secre-
tary use his or her authority to "providle] stability or prevent[] disruption to
the financial markets" and "protect[] the taxpayer."a The plan explicitly prec-
luded all judicial review."
Congress at first balked at this enormous proposed delegation of authority,
but as legislators haggled over what to do, the final product actually gave the
Secretary even more power than the initial Paulson proposal. Senator Dodd,
Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, proposed an amended bill that
retained the Paulson plan's basic elements while creating an oversight board,
requiring audits by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), placing re-
strictions on executive compensation at firms participating in the program, and
offering a smattering of aid to homeowners. Most importantly, the Dodd pro-
posal authorized the Secretary not only to buy mortgage-related assets, but also
to take equity stakes in financial firms.'9 The House of Representatives rejected
65. See Jeanne Sahadi, Bush Wants OK To Spend syooB, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept.
20, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/o9/2olnewsleconomy/bailout-proposal/
index.htm?postversion=2oo8o92oo9; Treasury's Bailout Proposal, CNNMo-
NEY.COM, Sept. 20, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2oo8/o/2o/news/economy/
treasury-proposal/index.htm?postversion=2oo8920n (reporting the text of the
proposed bill sent to lawmakers by the White House).
66. Treasury's Bailout Proposal, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
67. Id. Sec. 3.
68. Id. Sec. 8 ("Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are
non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by
any court of law or any administrative agency.").
69. Summary: Dodd Legislative Changes to Treasury Proposal (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4567.
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the amended plan.70 Three days later, however, the House returned to the bill,
which now included additional oversight mechanisms and a host of tax-breaks
and other pork barrel provisions to secure passage. The bill passed both cham-
bers of Congress and was signed into law as the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act (EESA) on October 3, 2oo87'
As ultimately enacted, EESA differs very little in substance from the Paul-
son and Dodd proposals. The central authorizing provision empowers the Trea-
sury Secretary "to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or 'TARP') to
purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets
from any financial institution . .. ."I This authorization is broader than the ini-
tial Paulson proposal, since the Act defines "troubled assets" to include not only
"residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other
instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages," but also "any other
financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase
of which is necessary to promote financial market stability. .. ." Moreover,
"financial institution" is defined broadly as "any institution, including but not
limited to" a list of various kinds of banks, dealers, and firms.7 4 In a very impor-
tant provision, EESA also bars the Treasury Secretary from making purchases of
greater than $oo million without receiving warrants from the financial institu-
tion that give the Treasury an option to receive non-voting common stock in
the institution." This provision was designed to enable the government to par-
ticipate in any increase in the bank's value resulting from TARP transactions
70. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Defiant House Rejects Huge Bailout; Stocks
Plunge; Next Step Is Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2oo8, at Ai, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/3Ocong.html.
71. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
72. Id. § ioi(a)(i), 122 Stat. 3767. In addition to this primary authorization provision,
the Act also contains another provision mandating that the Secretary establish a
program to insure troubled assets. Added to secure the votes of conservative Re-
publicans uncomfortable with more aggressive government interventions into fi-
nancial markets, this provision has had little impact on the actual operation of
TARP. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 102 OF THE EMERGENCY EcoNomic STABILIZATION ACT 1 (2008),
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AGP/secl02ReportToCongress.pdf ("It is
not anticipated that the [Asset Guarantee Program] will be made widely availa-
ble."); SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, Supra note 13, at 90 (describing the Asset
Guarantee Program).
73. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3(9).
74. Id. § 3(5). This definition is so broad that the Treasury Department has used it to
bail out two major automakers, Chrysler and General Motors. See SIGTARP, JULY
20o REPORT, supra note 13, at 107-10 (describing the automotive industry support
programs through TARP).




while limiting the government's downside exposure 6' EESA additionally re-
quires the Treasury Secretary to consult with various other government agen-
cies,7 to "take such steps as may be necessary to prevent 'unjust enrichment,'"'7
and to promulgate conflict-of-interest regulations.7 9
EESA also contains provisions regulating the compensation of executives at
firms that sell assets directly to the Treasury. Section 1i of the Act requires the
Secretary to promulgate regulations (i) limiting compensation schemes that in-
centivize excessive risk-taking, (2) requiring the recovery of bonuses based on
performance criteria that are later proven inaccurate, and (3) barring so-called
"golden parachute" payments. While the restriction on golden parachute pay-
ments is a flat prohibition, the other two restrictions essentially leave all of the
details of implementation up to the Secretary. This regulatory flexibility led
most observers to predict that the substance of these restrictions would be quite
mild. Yet executive compensation regulation proved politically potent, and in
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), also known as the sti-
mulus package, Congress retroactively imposed further compensation restric-
tions on the most senior officers of firms receiving $500 million or more in
TARP funds.So
EESA also has several important oversight provisions. Beyond a require-
ment of periodic reports to Congress,8' the Act creates a Financial Stability
Oversight Board composed of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Trea-
sury Secretary, the Director of the Federal Housing Authority, the Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development." This body is tasked with reviewing the Treasury Sec-
retary's use of his or her authority under EESA, making recommendations, and
reporting malfeasance." The Act also requires audits by the GAO, 4 establishes
76. By diluting the bank's common stock, however, the warrant provision also had
the perverse effect of discouraging the bank from raising additional capital by is-
suing new stock. See Principles that Should Have Guided TARP. Hearing Before the
Cong. Oversight Panel, utth Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Charles Calomiris),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-in909-calomiris.pdf.
77. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § lol(b).
78. Id. § ioi(e).
79. Id. § o8.
80. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123
Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009).
81. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 105.
82. Id. § 104.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 116.
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SIGTARP, and creates the Congressional Oversight Panel to aid Congress in
its supervision of the program."
The Act's provisions on judicial review are minimal and are drafted in a cu-
riously contradictory manner. On the one hand, section ni9(a)(1) provides that
"(ajctions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act shall be subject
to [the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)] . . . including that such final actions shall be held unlawful and set aside
if found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance
with law." This strong judicial review provision is then immediately undercut
by section 119(a)(2)(A), which provides that "[njo injunction or other form of
equitable relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant to [the
power-granting provisions of the Act) ... other than to remedy a violation of
the Constitution." Because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the APA's
judicial review provisions are equitable in nature,7 the second provision effec-
tively eliminates all judicial review conferred by the first provision, with the ex-
ception of review of constitutional claims. The end result of these provisions is
consistent with case law strongly disfavoring the preclusion of judicial review of
constitutional claims," but the circuitous drafting suggests that it is probably
the product of congressional haste rather than considered respect for judicial
precedent.9 In any case, firms participating in TARP have not turned to the
courts for protection, and judicial involvement in TARP has been non-
existent.9o
B. Establishment of the CPP
As the Treasury Department considered how it would use its newly ac-
quired authority in the weeks following EESA's enactment, credit markets re-
mained frozen and the stock market remained pessimistic. When the Treasury
finally made a decision, it chose to establish an equity purchase program rather
85. Id. § 121, 122.
86. Id.
87. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 619 na (2004) (referring to "the general provisions
for equitable relief within the Administrative Procedure Act").
88. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 366-74 (1974).
89. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 519-20 (suggesting that EESA's judicial re-
view provisions may be the result of hasty drafting); Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 9, at 1634 (same).
90. It should be noted that these provisions cover the Secretary's decisions as to what
transactions to enter into and on what terms. Once the Secretary has signed a
contract with a bank, either party may enforce that contract through regular con-




than an asset purchase program.9 ' This was a surprising change of course.
Although EESA clearly authorizes an equity purchase program,92 that power
was only added as part of the Dodd plan, and equity purchases did not figure
prominently in the public debates over EESA. Moreover, asset and equity pur-
chase plans rest on fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of the
financial crisis. An asset purchase plan essentially diagnoses the crisis as a li-
quidity problem, assuming that the banks are basically healthy but that market
panic is preventing them from selling the mortgage-backed assets on their bal-
ance sheets for their full true value. An equity purchase plan, on the other hand,
diagnoses the crisis as an insolvency problem, assuming that the banks are in
fact unable to cover their obligations and that the market is accurately pricing
mortgage-backed assets at a fraction of their face value. The Treasury's decision
thus represented a major shift.
Two primary factors account for the Treasury Department's about-face.
The first is that a number of European nations had coalesced around a strategy
of recapitalizing the banking system through equity injections. The United
Kingdom took the lead in adopting this approach, and after a special economic
summit, the major economies of continental Europe quickly followed suit.93
This international consensus was echoed by a scholarly consensus among econ-
omists across the ideological spectrum that partial nationalization through capi-
tal injections was the most efficient way to get credit flowing again.94
Second, fairly and responsibly running a $700 billion asset purchase pro-
gram would have represented an administrative task of gargantuan proportions.
The "troubled" mortgage-backed assets at the heart of the crisis were immensely
complicated securities, the value of each of which depended on the perfor-
mance of different pools of mortgages all across the country. Moreover, these
91. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Actions To Protect the U.S. Economy (Oct. 14, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1205.htm (announcing that $250 billion in
TARP funds would be used to "purchase equity stakes in a wide array of banks
and thrifts").
92. Equity shares clearly fall within EESA's broad definition of "troubled asset." See
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3(9). Moreover, the legislative history
specifically references authorizing equity purchases. In a colloquy with Represent-
ative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Repre-
sentative Jim Moran stated: "I do want to clarify that the intent of this legislation
is to authorize the Treasury Department to strengthen credit markets by infusing
capital into weak institutions in two ways: by buying their stock, debt, or other
capital instruments; and, two, by purchasing bad assets from the institutions."
Representative Frank replied: "I can affirm that." 154 CONG. REc. H1424 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 2oo8).
93. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER 2oo9 REPORT, supra note 44, at 17; Paul
Krugman, Op-Ed., Gordon Does Good, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2008, at A29, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/opinion/13krugman.html.
94. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 526.
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assets were not standardized and were not being traded in any kind of liquid
market-in fact, that was precisely the problem. The Treasury, therefore, would
have had to create guidelines for what categories of assets it would be willing to
purchase and evaluate each individual proffered asset's adherence to those
guidelines. Then, most importantly, the Treasury would have to set a price on
the very same assets the private market had proven itself unable to value. Many
commentators worried that banks and asset managers could easily manipulate
these prices to benefit insiders and politically connected firms.95 Equity shares,
by contrast, are standardized securities traded by and large in liquid markets;
moreover, an equity purchase program would require far fewer transactions to
achieve a similar systemic effect. As Interim Assistant Treasury Secretary Neel
Kashkari later explained: "[P]urchasing equity in healthy banks would be the
fastest way to inject much-needed capital into the financial system and restore
confidence," adding, rather understatedly, that "[iplliquid asset purchases...
would take longer to implement... ."9'
The Treasury's equity purchase program was born on October 14, 20o8,
when the heads of the nine largest U.S. banks were invited to a meeting with
Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, and the heads of the New York Federal
Reserve, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
According to reports and to the regulators' talking points memorandum, these
bankers were told-not asked-that their institutions would be accepting $125
billion in TARP capital injections.97 Later that day, the Treasury announced that
it would be making up to $250 billion available to eligible U.S. banks in the
95. See, e.g., Simon Johnson & James Kwak, A Hedge Fund Like No Other: A Key Task
for Congress: Matching Managers' and Taxpayers' Interests, WASH. PosT, Sept. 23,
2008, at A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2oo8/o9/22/AR2008092202584.html.
96. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Interim Assistant Secretary Neel Kash-
kari Remarks on Implementation of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(Nov. 19, 2oo8), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1281.htm. The Treasury
Department later set up an asset purchase program through TARP known as the
Public-Private Investment Program. The administrative complexity of that pro-
gram and the amount of run-up time required to get it moving appear to vindi-
cate Treasury's judgment that an equity purchase would be easier and faster to
implement. See SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, Supra note 13, at 100-05.
97. Mark Landler, U.S. Investing $25o Billion To Bolster Banks; Dow Surges 936 Points:
Stock Markets Rally Worldwide-Biggest Intervention Since '3os, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2008, at Ai, A14, available at http://query.nytimescom/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9 Do6E2DE173DF937A25753CIA96E9C8B63 (reporting that Secretary Paulson "es-
sentially told the participants that they would have to accept government invest-
ment for the good of the American financial system"); CEO Talking Points, Jum-
CIAL WATCH (Oct. 13, 2008), http:i/www.judicialwatch.org)fileskdocuments/
2009/Treasury-CEO-TalkingPoints.pdf (quoting Secretary of the Treasury Henry
M. Paulson, Jr.: "If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware that




form of purchases of preferred stock.98 That program was later dubbed the Cap-
ital Purchase Program (CPP).
IV. ADMINISTERING THE CPP
Although the Treasury Department created the CPP in part because it
would be easier to administer than an asset purchase program, the program by
no means ran itself. To get a sense of the administrative tasks involved in the
program, consider a hypothetical bank that wants to participate in the CPP.
Once the bank's management applies to the program, the Treasury must decide
whether to allow it to participate or not. If accepted, the bank and the Treasury
then have to execute a Securities Purchase Agreement (SPA) to effectuate the
transaction. Then the Treasury must monitor the bank's compliance with the
terms of the SPA, EESA, and any applicable regulations for the duration of the
time the Treasury holds the bank's securities. If the bank runs into trouble after
receiving the Treasury's capital injection, it might approach the Treasury about
restructuring its investment-after all, if the bank were to fail, the securities the
Treasury purchased would be worthless. The Treasury would then have to de-
cide whether or not to allow the restructuring. If the bank remains healthy, it
will eventually want to repurchase the securities it sold to the Treasury, forcing
the Treasury to decide when the bank is healthy enough to exit the program.
Finally, the Treasury must also decide how to dispose of the warrants EESA re-
quires it to receive from the bank.
This Part examines in detail how the Treasury dealt with each of these ele-
ments of the program-application processing, SPA execution, compliance
monitoring, consideration of restructuring requests, consideration of repur-
chasing requests, and disposition of warrants. This examination will show that,
in the absence of specific statutory commands enforced by judicial review, the
market-based structure of the program and the internal processes set up to
manage its implementation enabled the CPP to operate in accordance with sta-
ble, consistent rules that facilitated efficient administration, democratic over-
sight, and protection of banks' legal rights.
A. Application Processing
The process that the Treasury established to sift through banks' applica-
tions to participate in the CPP clearly shows the importance of managerial ac-
countability mechanisms in the program's successful administration. Rather
than analyzing each applicant institution itself, the Treasury delegated the lion's
share of responsibility for application processing to the four federal banking
agencies (FBAs)-the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the OCC, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). In order to ensure that the FBAs exercised this dele-
98. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Pur-
chase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/presslreleases/
hp1207.htm.
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gated authority in line with the Treasury's priorities, the Treasury issued guide-
lines detailing the grounds on which applications should be accepted or re-
jected.99 Senior officials in the FBAs in turn developed their own guidelines and
processes to control the discretion of line employees within that FBA. 0 0 A hie-
rarchical administrative structure thus necessitated steps to ensure that each
bank's application was evaluated according to articulated standards of general
applicability. In the only cases in which the Treasury deviated from these
steps-the first nine applications to the program-it did so only because it was
necessary to overcome a collective action problem and get the CPP up and run-
ning. 0
Since the purpose of the CPP was to inject capital into the banking system
quickly, it is not surprising that the application process the Treasury established
was quite streamlined. When the program was announced, the Treasury and the
FBAs each posted a six-page CPP application on their respective websites.'o2 The
first four pages of this application consisted entirely of information about the
program, and the fifth asked only for contact information. Only the final page
of the application required any substantive information about the applicant in-
stitution."o The Treasury was able to use this pared-down application by leve-
raging the pre-existing knowledge, expertise, and administrative infrastructure
of the FBAs. Treasury officials instructed banks to consult with the appropriate
FBA in the first instance and to submit their application to that FBA rather than
to the Treasury.0 4 The FBAs then evaluated each application and forwarded a
recommendation on to the Treasury.
99. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RE-
SERVE SYSTEM, AUDIT OF THE BOARD'S PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS FOR THE
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM UNDER THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 14
(2009) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/CPPFinalReport-.30.og-for-web.pdf.
ioo. See id, at 14-16 (describing the Federal Reserve's internal procedures for
processing CPP applications); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CONTROLS OVER THE FDIC's PROCESSING OF
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM APPLICATIONS FROM FDIC-SUPERVISED
INSTITUTIONS 2-7 (2009) [hereinafter FDIC OIG REPORT), available at
http://www.fdicoig.gov/reportso9/o9-oo4EV.pdf (describing the FDIC's internal
procedures for processing CPP applications).
io0. See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
102. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paul-
son, Jr. on Capital Purchase Program (Oct. 20, 2oo8), http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/hpi223.htm.
103. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR TARP CAPITAL
PURCHASE PROGRAM, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/application-
guidelines.pdf (last accessed Nov. 20, 2010).
104. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 98; U.S. DEP'T OF THE




The guidance document the Treasury issued to circumscribe the FBAs' dis-
cretion, entitled Process for Evaluation of QFI [Qualified Financial Institutions]
Participation in the TARP Capital Purchase Program, has not been publicly re-
leased' 5 But other Treasury guidance, congressional testimony by Treasury of-
ficials, and reports by SIGTARP, the Inspector General of the Federal Reserve,
and the Inspector General of the FDIC have revealed the program's basic eligi-
bility standards.o' The Treasury has insisted from the beginning that CPP capi-
tal injections were intended to shore up banks that were "healthy" and "viable,"
not to bail out failing banks."o' The FBAs, therefore, were instructed to evaluate
applicant institutions' viability based on standard bank examination ratings"'s
http:/Iwww.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/faqcpp.pdf (last accessed NOV. 20,
2010).
105. See FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 99, at 14 (stating the name of the
guidance document).
1o6. See FDIC OJG REPORT, supra note oo; FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra
note 99; SIGTARP, INITIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 8, zoo8, at 5o-
52 (2008) [hereinafter SIGTARP, INITIAL REPORT]; US. Dep't of the
Treasury, Factsheet on Capital Purchase Program, FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV (Oct.
3, 2010), http://www.financialstability.govlroadtostability/CPPfactsheet.htm. The
Federal Reserve's Inspector General has described the Treasury's initial guidance
on CPP applications as "limited." FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 99,
at 14.
107. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note lo2 (describing the
CPP as "designed to attract broad participation from healthy institutions"); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Provides Funding To Bolster
Healthy, Local Banks (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tgo3.htm (describing the CPP as "a means to directly infuse capital into healthy,
viable banks").
1o8. Treasury has relied upon three different kinds of ratings: the CAMELS rating, the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating, and, for bank holding companies,
the C/RFI rating. SIGTARP, OPPORTUNITIEs To STRENGTHEN CONTROLS To
AvoID UNDUE EXTERNAL INFLUENCE OVER CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM DEcI-
SION-MAKING 26 (2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP, OPPORTUNITIES To
STRENGTHEN CONTROLs], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/
Opportunities to StrengthenControls.pdf. A bank's CAMELS rating is a score
on a scale of one to five based on capital adequacy, asset quality, management,
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. See SIGTARP, INITIAL REPORT,
supra note io6, at 52. A bank's CRA rating rates the bank's performance in the
context of its business strategy, community, and competitors. See SIGTARP, Op-
PORTUNITIES To STRENGTHEN CONTROLS, supra note 1o8, at 5-6 n.4. A C/RFI rat-
ing rates a bank holding company's financial condition and the potential risk it
poses to its subsidiary depository institution(s). See Letter from Richard Spillen-
kothen, Dir. of the Div. of Banking Supervision and Regulation for the Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and
Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Fed. Reserve
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and specified performance measures,'09 as well as certain "mitigating factors"
the FBAs could consider if an applicant institution failed to meet one or more
of the performance measures."o
In addition to application criteria, the Treasury also established a multi-
level application review process. For each applicant bank, the FBAs were to pre-
pare a "case decision memo" providing a brief narrative about the bank and
classifying it in one of three categories."' Applications in the first category, for
banks with the highest examination ratings, were forwarded directly to the
TARP Investment Council at the Treasury, which could grant preliminary ap-
proval subject to the final decision of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Sta-
bility. Applications in the second category, for banks with lower examination
ratings, were forwarded to an intermediate body called the CPP Council. Con-
sisting of representatives from the four FBAs, the CPP Council could ask for
additional information, recommend withdrawal of the application, or recom-
mend approval, in which case the application would be forwarded up to the
TARP Investment Council. Banks with applications in the third category, for
banks with weak examination ratings, were asked for additional information or
advised to withdraw their applications."'
The description of this complex interagency process is somewhat mislead-
ing, however, because the Treasury Department was extremely deferential to the
recommendations made by the FBAs. Indeed, for at least the first eleven months
of the program, the Treasury did not reject a single CPP application that an
FBA had recommended for approval."3 Accordingly, while as a formal matter,
all application decisions rested with the Treasury Secretary as required by EESA,
in practice the actual decision making took place inside the FBAs, where bank
examinations were conducted and performance measures and mitigating fac-
tors were analyzed. Each FBA developed its own internal review process, com-
posed of preliminary recommendations by regional offices and multiple levels
Bank and All Bank Holding Companies (Dec. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2o4/sro4l8.htm.
109. The performance measures "relate to acceptable percentages for classified assets,
non-performing loans, other real estate owned, and construction and develop-
ment loans." See FEDERAL RESERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 99, at 14.
no. FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note oo, at 8.
m. See SIGTARP, OPPORTUNITIEs To STRENGTHEN CONTROLS, supra note io8, at
26-27.
u2. See SIGTARP, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 1o6, at 52-53.
113. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Good Billions After Bad, VANITY FAIR,




of review at the headquarters in Washington, D.C.' 4 Indeed, there is evidence
that at least one FBA, the FDIC, actually tweaked the review process on its own
initiative, forwarding applications that only barely met the criteria for the first
category to the intermediate CPP Council instead of the TARP Investment
Council."' The Treasury thus set out the standards for acceptance to the pro-
gram, while the FBAs made all of the actual decisions.
The Treasury's reliance on the FBAs represented a sensible administrative
structure for the CPP along several dimensions: it leveraged the FBAs' pre-
existing knowledge, expertise, and administrative infrastructure; it enabled the
CPP to get up and running in a matter of weeks; it minimized the possibility of
conflict with the larger structure of federal banking regulation; and it protected
the FBAs' bureaucratic turf. At the same time, the basis for this critical coopera-
tion between the Treasury and the FBAs, like many aspects of the administra-
tion of the CPP, was remarkably informal. The CPP's administrative structure
was announced by press release,"' and no memoranda of understanding or oth-
er interagency agreements have come to light, indicating that these relationships
were based entirely on informal agreements among the relevant agency officials.
The Treasury informally consulted with the FBAs in the design of the CPP ap-
plication process,"' and the FBAs sought additional guidance from Treasury of-
ficials by email when questions arose." This informality is somewhat less sur-
prising for the OCC and OTS, which are bureaus of the Treasury Department
and therefore subject to the Treasury Secretary's hierarchical control, but it is
quite surprising for the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, both of which are inde-
pendent agencies. Still, informality does not appear to have hindered the CPP's
operation. A preliminary scholarly study has shown that the actual distribution
of CPP funds was consistent with the Treasury's announced policy of only pro-
viding aid to healthy, viable banks."'
114. See SIGTARP, OPPORTUNITIES To STRENGTHEN CONTROLS, supra note 108, at 4-
9; see also FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note oo, at 2-7 (describing the FDIC's inter-
nal review process); FEDERAL REsERVE OIG REPORT, supra note 99, at 14-16 (de-
scribing the Federal Reserve Board's internal review process).
115. FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note loo, at 9.
116. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 98.
117. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 102.
n8. See FDIC OIG REPORT, supra note loo, at 6.
11g. Dinara Bayazitova & Anil Shivdasani, Assessing TARP (Aug. 29, 2oo9) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1461884 (finding that banks receiving CPP funds had
stronger loan portfolios than banks that did not participate, leading to the conclu-
sion that "approval appears to have been provided to promote the financial stabil-
ity of healthy banks rather than the bailout of economically unhealthy banks").
Another recent study has suggested that the extent of banks' political ties to the
Federal Reserve and to the relevant congressional committees significantly af-
fected how much funding they received through CPP, with the effect being par-
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It is worth mentioning at this point that several CPP-participating banks
have claimed that their federal regulator leaned on them to apply to the pro-
gram when they otherwise would not have done so.' It is impossible to deter-
mine from the public record exactly what transpired between these banks and
their regulators, but the claims are widespread enough to be credible, raising
questions about the manner in which the FBAs exercised the authority the
Treasury de facto delegated to them. Part of the problem was clearly that many
banks felt hamstrung by the perception that the CPP was just another bailout
program"' and were reluctant to participate for fear of being stigmatized by in-
vestors and customers.' 2 The deeper problem, however, lies in the tension be-
tween the CPP's pressing macroeconomic goal of recapitalizing the banking sys-
tem as quickly as possible and the fact that EESA did not authorize coercive
regulation, only voluntary transactions. To mediate this tension, the FBAs ap-
parently at times implicitly threatened to use their pre-existing coercive regula-
tory powers to convince reluctant banks to "get with the program," so to speak.
But it is hard to imagine how the Treasury could have designed the CPP to
avoid this dynamic. The risk of implied threats was built into the structure not
only of the CPP, but of EESA itself; indeed, this type of risk is inherent in any
scheme in which the government proposes to enter into a voluntary transaction
with a pervasively regulated entity like a bank. Even if the FBAs had not been
the agencies receiving and initially processing CPP applications, the FBAs still
would have been aware of the program's existence and would have had their
pre-existing regulatory authority, creating the possibility of implicit threats.
Moreover, in the midst of an extreme crisis in which banks played a key role, it
is not surprising that bank regulators were emboldened to push the limits of
their powers. Indeed, SIGTARP has actually faulted the Treasury and the Feder-
al Reserve for not leveraging their coercive regulatory powers more aggressively
ticularly strong for weaker banks. See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, TARP In-
vestments: Financials and Politics (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=i4z6219. Howev-
er, this study did not bracket out the first nine banks to participate in the CPP,
which the government essentially forced to participate due to concerns about the
"too-big-to-fail" phenomenon and collective action problems. See infra notes 125-
127 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Some Banks Tell U.S. To Keep Bailout Cash, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/10/31/
business/3lplan.html; Loren Steffy, Here, Banks, Take This Money Whether You
Need it or Not, HoustoN CHRON., Oct. 31, 2oo8, http://www.chron.com/disp/
story.mpl/business/steffy/6087315.html. For the special case of the first nine banks
to participate in the CPP, see infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
121. Given (i) the long string of government bailouts that preceded the passage of
EESA, see supra Part II, and (2) that the first si25 billion of CPP was given to the
nation's nine largest banks, many of which were generally regarded as insolvent,
this perception was not entirely unreasonable.




in their dealings with AIG and its counterparties."I Thus, while banks' claims of
regulatory pressure raise questions, what is most remarkable about these claims
is not that they are being made, but rather that they are not more serious and
widespread.
The one instance in which regulators clearly did pressure banks-
forcefully-was in the October 14, 2oo8 meeting in which the country's nine
largest banks were first convinced to participate. While these initial nine trans-
actions'2 4 were part of the CPP, they did not go through the CPP application
process that the Treasury later established and are sui generis. These initial par-
ticipating institutions faced a collective action problem stemming from the fact
that TARP was still perceived as a bailout program. If the Treasury simply let
these institutions apply individually, any institution that chose to participate
would be seen as ailing and in need of help. This perception would have de-
stroyed the bank's ability to raise capital in the private market and possibly
started a run on the bank. Consequently, no institution would apply, despite
the fact that many of them desperately needed additional capital.'25 Moreover,
there was no point in restricting the program to a subset of these banks that the
Treasury deemed "viable," due to the "too-big-to-fail" problem. If an institu-
tion were excluded from the program and labeled "non-viable," investors
would immediately pull their money out and a bank run would ensue. Then,
because all of these large institutions were incredibly systemically important, the
government would just have to intervene to forestall further panic. Accordingly,
Treasury opted simply to have all nine institutions join the program simulta-
neously, with the Treasury Secretary declaring all of them to be "healthy,"26
even though some of them almost certainly were not.'27 The regulatory pressure
exerted against these banks thus had a clear public purpose, since it was the only
way to get the program off the ground.
123. SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JANUARY 2010, at 20 (20o) [herei-
nafter SIGTARP, JANUARY 2010 REPORT), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/
reports/congress/2010/January2o_QuarterlyReportjto-Congress.pdf.
124. This count of nine treats Merrill Lynch and Bank of America as separate institu-
tions, although at the time, the latter was in the process of buying the former.
125. See Jane Sasseen & Theo Francis, Paulson's $250 Billion Bank Buy, BLOOMBERG Bu-
SINESSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/oct2oo8/db2oo8to13-441566-page_2.htm.
126. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 91 ("These are healthy
institutions, and they have taken this step for the good of the U.S. economy.").
127. See SIGTARP, EMERGENCY CAPITAL INTECTIONS PROVIDED To SUPPORT THE
VIABILITY OF BANK OF AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR BANKS, AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 14 (2009), available at http://sigtarp.govlreportsaudit/2009/Emergency
Capital Injections Provided toSupport-theViability-ofBank ofAmerica...
00509.pdf (determining that several of the initial nine banks to participate in
the CPP were not "healthy" at the time they entered the program).
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B. Securities Purchase Agreements
Once the Treasury accepted a bank's application to the program, the next
step in the process was for the Treasury and the applicant bank to sign a Securi-
ties Purchase Agreement (SPA) to effect the transaction. After the first nine
transactions, the Treasury developed standardized SPAs for the various types of
banks eligible to participate in the CPP, as well as term sheets explaining the
contract terms, which it posted on its website."' The decision to use standar-
dized contracts flowed directly from hierarchical managerial concerns, since
they enabled senior officials at the Treasury to maintain control over the hun-
dreds of transactions the CPP eventually entailed. The market structure of the
CPP, however, constrained the Treasury's discretion over the terms of the stan-
dard SPAs, since they had to be generous enough to draw banks to apply. In the
words of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability, the SPAs
were "designed... to be attractive to encourage broad participation, while also
including important taxpayer protections."" 9
The standardized SPA terms allow the Treasury to purchase senior pre-
ferred shares totaling between one and three percent of the bank's risk-weighted
assets, up to $25 billion. The shares accrue dividends at a rate of five percent an-
nually for the first five years, and, in order to encourage prompt repayment, at a
rate of nine percent thereafter. The Treasury also received warrants for com-
mon shares totaling fifteen percent of the dollar amount of the senior preferred
shares purchased. The exercise price of the warrants is the common share price
at the time the senior preferred shares are purchased. The preferred shares carry
no voting rights except on decisions to issue securities senior to the preferred
shares, unless the bank should fail to pay the required dividends, in which case
the Treasury gains certain voting rights. While the warrant common shares car-
ry voting rights, the SPA specifies that the Treasury will not exercise them. The
128. The only differences among the terms for different types of banks are designed to
account for different ownership structures and tax treatments. See U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program (Mutual Banks and Savings Asso-
ciations), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPP%2oTerm%2oSheet%2o
-%2oMutual%2oBanks.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2010); U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
TARP Capital Purchase Program (Non-Public QFIs, excluding Mutual Banks and
Savings Associations), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/Term%2oSheet
%20%20Private%20C%2OCorporations.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2010); U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program, Senior Preferred Stocks and
Warrants, Summary of Senior Preferred Terms, http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/termsheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Senior Preferred Stocks]; U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, TARP
Capital Purchase Program, (Subchapter S Corporations) (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/scorp-term-sheet.pdf
129. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial





preferred shares, the warrants, and the warrant common shares are all, with a
very limited exception, freely transferable by the Treasury.o
The Congressional Oversight Panel has criticized the Treasury Department
for not getting a good enough deal for taxpayers in the SPAs, claiming that for
each dollar the Treasury spent, it only received securities worth sixty-six cents.'
But the Treasury left the application window open for over a year and still did
not spend all of the $250 billion it initially allocated to the program. Harsher
terms would have led to even smaller subscriptions. Moreover, the Treasury was
prevented from taking idiosyncratic, bank-specific risks into account in its pric-
ing decisions, since it did not negotiate each transaction individually, but ra-
ther, in order to enable the program to run more smoothly and consistently,
made these deals through standardized SPAs. Finally, unlike in transactions
with other private actors, banks dealing with the Treasury had to price in the
risk that Congress might later retroactively impose additional restrictions on
CPP-participating banks, as Congress in fact did through ARRA.3Z In any case,
the very question as to whether the standard SPA terms were too generous
highlights the tension between the Treasury's macroeconomic regulatory mis-
sion to recapitalize the banking system and its fiscal mission to protect taxpay-
ers. The Treasury's efforts to streamline the CPP, systematize its transactions,
and encourage broad participation thus may have prevented it from seeking the
best possible deal in every transaction. Such is the price of a consistently and
effectively administered recapitalization program premised upon voluntary
market transactions.
C. Compliance Monitoring
Once an SPA was finalized, the terms of the SPA, EESA, and ARRA all
placed restrictions on the bank's activities for the period of time that the Trea-
sury was to be a shareholder. The SPA, for example, by transacting a sale of pre-
ferred shares, inherently limits the bank's ability to pay dividends on its com-
mon stock. In order to encourage the bank to remain adequately capitalized,
the SPA also restricts the bank's ability to repurchase certain types of its own
130. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program, Senior
Preferred Stocks and Warrants, Summary of Senior Preferred Terms,
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/termsheet.pdf. The text of this term-
sheet describes the SPA terms for a public bank. The terms for other types of
banks are slightly different, but are structured to be economically identical. See
sources cited in supra note 128.
131. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY'S
AcQuisiTioNs 4 (2oo), available at http://cop.senate.govidocuments/cop-
020609-report.pdf.
132. See John Faust, TARP's 66-Cent Myth, REAL TIME EcONOMICS (Apr. 24, 2009,
6:oo AM), http:lblogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/o4/24/guest-contribution-tarps-
66-cent-myth/ (arguing that these types of considerations show that Treasury did
not in fact overpay for the securities it received).
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securities from third parties."' The most important restrictions, however, are
EESA's executive compensation provisions, which ARRA expanded and streng-
thened. ARRA also contains a provision restricting banks' ability to hire non-
immigrant foreign workers." 4
As with application processing, the Treasury delegated responsibility for
monitoring banks' compliance with these requirements to the FBAs. Unlike ap-
plication processing, however, the Treasury has played a more limited role in
defining how the FBAs conduct compliance monitoring. In a December 2008
report, the GAO noted that the Treasury had not yet set up compliance moni-
toring mechanisms and that FBAs disagreed among themselves as to their mon-
itoring responsibilities."' Over time, however, the FBAs coordinated among
themselves and developed mechanisms to assess an institution's adherence to
CPP and other TARP requirements. These mechanisms were later integrated
into the FBAs' other bank examination functions."6 Indeed, the FBAs have at
times even gone further than the Treasury has asked in monitoring CPP-
participating banks. Shortly after the CPP was established, SIGTARP and the
Congressional Oversight Panel began pushing the Treasury to require institu-
tions receiving TARP funds to track and disclose what they did with the taxpay-
ers' money."' The Treasury initially refused, arguing that the fungibility of
money rendered such an exercise pointless; only in December of 2oo did it fi-
nally agree to implement this recommendation."8 At least three of the four
FBAs, however, had already been monitoring participating banks' use of CPP
funds for some time at that point. 19
133. See Prester, supra note 4, at 947-48.
134. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. ni-5, § 16n, 123 Stat. u,
304 (2009).
135. U.S. Gov'T AccOurrABLITY OFFICE (hereinafter GAOl, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED To BETTER ENSURE
INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 27 (2008), available at
http:/Iwww.gao.gov/new.items/dogl6i.pdf.
136. GAO, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ONE YEAR LATER, ACTIONS ARE
NEEDED To ADDRESS REMAINING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHAL-
LENGES 18-19 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/diol6.pdf.
137. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE $700 BILLION
EMERGENCY EcoNocMC STABILIZATION FUNDS 11-12 (2008), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121008.pdf; SIGTARP, INITIAL REPORT, Su-
pra note 106, at 8.
138. See SIGTARP, JANUARY 2010 REPORT, supra note 123, at 139-40. For more on the
back and forth between Treasury and the oversight bodies on this issue, see James
E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 429-36 (2olo).
139. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009 11 (2009), available at http://www.occ.treas.goviannrpt/i-




The most interesting aspect of the CPP's compliance monitoring system is
the unique structure established to evaluate banks' adherence to EESA's restric-
tions on executive compensation. The Treasury's executive compensation regu-
lations promulgated under EESA and ARRA require non-public banks to submit
certifications of compliance to both the Treasury and to the appropriate FBA,
but require public banks to submit their executive compensation certifications
to the Treasury and the SEC instead.140 The Treasury thus shifted responsibility
over public banks in this area from the FBAs to the SEC, an enforcement agency
that played a relatively minor role in the government's response to the financial
crisis.14' This unique delegation to the SEC suggests that the Treasury Depart-
ment did not view the executive compensation regulations as part and parcel of
the CPP, but rather as a distinct regulatory scheme with a separate purpose.
That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Treasury opposed the stringent
retroactive executive compensation provisions in ARRA'# and supported the
recent statute creating the new Small Business Lending Fund,41 which will op-
erate much like the CPP but without any executive compensation restrictions.'"
Executive compensation regulation is one of the elements of TARP that has
received the most detailed attention from Congress. At the same time, the Trea-
sury's apparent view that the executive compensation restrictions distract from
TARP's central purpose has merit. The restrictions have served as a flashpoint
for banks' disillusionment with the CPP, and there is considerable evidence that
many banks withdrew their CPP applications after the more restrictive provi-
sions in ARRA went into effect. The restrictions are also a major reason why
many banks have sought to exit the CPP early.145 The intervention of elected
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY ExAMINA-
TIoN RESPONSE KIT 2 (2oo9), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/4830002.pdf.
140. See 31 C.F.R. § 30.7(c) (2008).
141. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 15, at 500-01 ("[T]he SEC rarely played an im-
portant role at any stage of the crisis.").
142. See Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Stimulus Plan Tightens Reins on Wall St.
Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 2009, at Ai, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo91
02/14/business/economy/14pay.html.
143. SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 86.
144. See Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2oo, Pub. L. No. 111-240, §§ 4101-4113,
124 Stat. 2504, 2582 (2010). It is also worth noting that in the recently enacted fi-
nancial regulatory reform statute, Congress assigned the enforcement of new ex-
ecutive compensation restrictions almost entirely to the SEC rather than the
FBAs. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 951-960, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1907 (2010).
145. See Jane K. Storero & Lawrence R. Wiseman, To Redeem or Not To Redeem?: Con-
siderations in Determining Whether To Exit the TARP Capital Purchase Program,
126 BANKING L.J. 625 (2009); Brian Cadman, Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J.
Lynch, Executive Pay Restrictions: Do They Restrict Firms' Willingness To
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representatives responding to political forces created a statutory anomaly-a
coercive regulatory provision mixed into a voluntary transactional program-
which the Treasury has attempted to blunt through a countervailing anomaly in
the CPP's administrative structure. The CPP's compliance monitoring system
thus shows that while political realities have clearly impacted how the Treasury
has run the CPP, they have detracted from, rather than contributed to, the pro-
gram's structural and administrative coherence.
D. Restructuring CPP Investments
Once the Treasury has invested in a CPP-participating bank, it must not
only monitor the bank's compliance with its obligations, but, if the bank runs
into financial trouble, it may also have to decide whether to restructure its in-
vestment through a securities exchange. Although a restructured investment
will typically leave the Treasury holding securities with greater risk or a lower
rate of return than the CPP-preferred shares it originally received, a securities
exchange will often still be beneficial if it decreases the likelihood that the bank
will fail altogether, in which case the Treasury's investment would lose all of its
value.
In keeping with its fiscal obligation to taxpayers, the Treasury treats deci-
sions on restructuring its CPP investments very much as a private investor or
creditor would. The Treasury only considers a securities exchange if a bank
comes forward with a restructuring proposal, in which case it directs the pro-
posal to an outside asset manager for study and to conduct due diligence on the
bank's health.14'6 As of June 30, 2010, the Treasury had conducted securities ex-
changes with only eight CPP-participating banks.147 However, the Treasury has
stated that institutions that participate in the recently announced Community
Development Capital Initiative and the Small Business Lending Fund program
may convert their CPP-preferred shares into the new standardized securities
created in these programs. '* These two programs are designed to encourage
smaller community banks and financial institutions to increase lending to small
businesses, the dearth of which the Treasury views as a significant drag on the
economic recovery.149 Now that the banking industry has been pulled back from
the brink of collapse, the Treasury appears to be using securities exchanges to
fine-tune the incentives that its investments give to participating banks. The
market structure of the CPP, however, constrains the Treasury's ability to
Participate in TARP? (Aug. 2oxo) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
management.bu.edulacademics/departments/documents/CCL_120709.pdf.
146. SIGTARP, July 2oo REPORT, supra note 13, at 80.
147. Id. at 81 (listing CPP securities exchanges).
148. Id. at 85-86.
149. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Unlocking Credit for Small





change banks' obligations midstream in response to shifting policy imperatives;
in order to obtain a bank's consent to a securities exchange, the Treasury must
make it attractive enough to be worthwhile.
E. Repurchasing CPP-Preferred Shares
The penultimate administrative element of the CPP program concerns
banks' ability to exit the program by buying back their CPP-preferred shares
from the Treasury.' Permitting a bank to exit the program is an extremely im-
portant regulatory decision, since when a bank repurchases its shares, the
bank's capital base decreases by the dollar amount of those shares, and the bank
is no longer subject to the restrictions described above. The guidelines the Trea-
sury has announced on repayment for most banks are quite vague, although the
rules announced for the nation's largest banks, whose shares represent the lion's
share of CPP outlays, are somewhat more specific.5 Overall, however, the Trea-
sury has allowed banks that want to exit the program to do so in order to enable
the government to end its ownership of private financial firms sooner rather
than later.' As of June 30, 2010, eighty-two banks had repurchased some or all
of their CPP-preferred shares, totaling $146.9 billion in repayments. 3
Repayment and exit from the CPP are governed by a combination of statu-
tory provisions, SPA terms, and Treasury policy. As initially enacted, EESA was
silent on repayment, which accords with Congress's belief at the time that it was
authorizing an asset purchase program rather than an equity purchase program
like the CPP. When the Treasury launched the CPP, it included a clause in the
150. In addition to deciding if and when to allow repayment, Treasury must of course
also decide at what price to allow the bank to repurchase the preferred shares. The
decision on price, however, is controlled by the SPA, which provides that the bank
must simply pay back whatever Treasury initially paid for the shares, plus the val-
ue of any unpaid dividends. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Senior Preferred
Stocks, supra note 128.
151. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: TARP REPAYMENTS, IN-
CLUDING THE REPURCHASE OF STOCK WARRANTS 10-11, 17-18 (2009) [hereinafter
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT], available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-o7'oo9-report.pdf.
152. Indeed, critics have charged that the Treasury has at times allowed banks eager to
get out from under restrictions on executive compensation to exit the program
too early. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Citi's TARP Repayment: The Downside for a
Troubled Bank, TIME, Dec. 15, 2oo, http://www.time.com/time/business/articlel
o,8599,1947625,oo.html.
153. SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 71. Three smaller CPP-
participating banks have declared bankruptcy and therefore will never pay back
taxpayers' investments. SIGTARP, JANUARY 2oo REPORT, supra note 123, at 53.
Treasury has also received $9.4 billion in dividend and interest payments, with 105
CPP-participating banks having missed a dividend or interest payment.
SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 72.
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standard SPA under which banks were not permitted to repurchase their shares
for three years unless they raised an equivalent amount of capital from private
investors. 154 Given that a large part of the reason that the CPP was necessary in
the first place is that private capital was hard to come by, this clause made re-
purchasing CPP shares quite difficult for banks. In early 2009, however, the
clause was superseded by a provision of ARRA that made repayment easier for
banks. Section ini(g) of EESA as amended now provides that "subject to consul-
tation with the appropriate federal banking agency, (the Treasury] shall permit
a TARP recipient to repay [CPP-preferred shares] without regard to whether
the financial institution has replaced such funds from any other source or to
any waiting period .. . ."5
As a result of this statutory change, the Treasury had to develop a policy on
when it and the FBAs will allow banks to exit the CPP through repayment. The
Treasury has explained that three principles guide its decisions on CPP repay-
ment: "maintaining systemic stability," "[pireserving the stability of individual
institutions," and "maximizing return on investment" for the taxpayer."' But as
the Congressional Oversight Panel has noted, these principles will often point in
different directions, and are broad enough to justify any decision that the Trea-
sury ultimately makes.5 7 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has stated that
the "ultimate test" for repurchase decisions is the effect that repayment would
have on the overall availability of credit in the economy.5' Yet even this single
criterion is ambiguous enough to be quite malleable.
For most CPP-participating banks, the Treasury and the FBAs have not
publicly provided any guidance beyond these broad principles."'9 But for the
sixteen largest CPP-participating banks that also participated in the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), the Treasury and the Federal Reserve an-
nounced more detailed rules that accord with the requirements of that pro-
gram. SCAP, popularly known as the "stress test," was a TARP program
154. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 151, at 1o.
155. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115,
516 (2009). Note that this provision gives implicit congressional ratification to the
Treasury's decision to delegate significant amounts of administrative authority
over the CPP to the FBAs.
156. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: ExITiNG TARP AND
UNWINDING ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 29-30 (2010), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-oil4io-report.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Hearing before the Cong. IOversight Panel, iuth Cong. (Apr. 21, 2oo) (statement of
Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary), available at http://cop.senate.gov/
hearings/library/hearing-042109-geithner.cfm.
159. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, FAQs on Capital Purchase Program Repayment
and the Capital Assistance Program, http://www.financialstability.govfdocs





through which the Treasury and the FBAs analyzed the capital structure of the
nation's largest banks to determine if they needed additional capital to remain
healthy, and if so, how much."'o In a joint press release, the heads of the Trea-
sury Department, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC stated that if
SCAP banks desire to repurchase their CPP shares, they must first show that
upon repayment they would still have enough capital to cover the capital "buf-
fer" mandated by SCAP.'6 ' The Federal Reserve later added that SCAP banks
would also have to raise a sizeable amount of equity from private investors and
issue long-term debt without the help of FDIC aid." As of July 1, 2010, thirteen
of the sixteen SCAP banks that participated in the CPP had fully exited the pro-
gram.'63
F. Warrant Disposition
The final element of the administration of the CPP pertains to the disposi-
tion of the warrants that EESA requires the Treasury to acquire from any firm
receiving more than sioo million in TARP funds. A warrant is simply "a securi-
ty that permits the holder to buy a specified number of common shares (the
'underlying' shares) at a specified price (the 'strike price') on or before a speci-
fied date (the 'expiration')."'6 4 In financial terms, it is a type of call option. The
warrants issued through the CPP give the Treasury Department the option to
buy common shares in the CPP-participating bank at a price equal to the share
price at the time the SPA is signed, in an amount totaling fifteen percent of the
dollar amount of the CPP-preferred shares purchased at any time within ten
years. Because the strike price is equal to the price at the time the SPA is signed,
these warrants give the U.S. taxpayer the ability to participate in the upside
from a rise in the bank's stock price without carrying any risk if the stock price
falls. Half of a bank's TARP warrants are freely transferable at any time; the oth-
16o. SIGTARP, JANUARY 2010 REPORT, supra note 123, at 51.
161. Press Release, Joint Statement by Sec'y of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner,
Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Sheila Bair, and Comptroller of the Cur-
rency John C. Dugan, The Treasury Capital Assistance Program and the Supervi-
sory Capital Assessment Program (May 6, 2009), http:/Iwww.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/200905o6a.htm.
162. Press Release, The Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (June 1, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.govinewsevents/press/bcreg/2ooo96olb.htm.
163. See List of 19 Banks Undergoing Stress Tests, REAL TIME EcoNoMics
(Apr. 24, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/o4/24/list-ofi9-
banks-undergoing-stress-tests/; U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Troubled
Asset Relief Program Transactions Report, FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOv, http://
www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/7-1-io%2oTransactions
%2oReport%2oas%20of%206-30-1o.pdf (last visited Dec. 1o, 2010).
164. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 151, at y.
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er half can be exercised or transferred only if the bank elects not to raise an
equivalent amount of capital from the private market.''
Like decisions on repayment, the Treasury's decisions on warrant disposi-
tion are governed by a combination of statute, contract, and policy. EESA as
originally enacted simply required the Treasury to exercise or sell the warrants
when "the Secretary determines that the market is optimal for selling such as-
sets, in order to maximize the value for taxpayers... .""' An amendment to
EESA then mandated that the Treasury "liquidate" the warrants when banks re-
purchase their CPP-preferred shares.'6 ' A further amendment restored the
Treasury's discretion over warrant disposition, providing that it "may liquidate
warrants associated with [TARP] assistance.""' Ultimately, however, these sta-
tutory amendments were ineffectual, since the Treasury had limited its own sta-
tutory discretion over warrant disposition through the standard SPA. Under the
SPA, once CPP-participating banks have repurchased their preferred shares,
they can also buy back their warrants upon notice to the Treasury. 9 Aside from
this contractual obligation, the Treasury has also stated that its policy is to dis-
pose of warrants as soon as possible in order to disengage the government from
private markets and minimize any long-tail risk.'"
Unlike repayment, for which any issues concerning the price of the transac-
tion were resolved by the SPA, the Treasury and the banks must negotiate a
price for the warrants. EESA's provisions on warrant pricing are very open-
ended, requiring only that the terms and conditions of the warrants be written
"at a minimum ... to provide for reasonable participation by the Secretary, for
the benefit of taxpayers, in equity appreciation... ."' The SPA for public
banks follows that mandate by establishing an elaborate negotiating process
through which the Treasury and the bank can agree on the warrants' "fair mar-
165. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Form of Warrant To Purchase Common Stock,
§ i3(H), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/warrant.pdf.
166. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 113(a)(2)(A), 122
Stat. 3765, 3778 (2008).
167. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 1u-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115,
520 (2009).
168. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 403, 123 Stat.
1632, 1658 (2009).
169. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Senior Preferred Stocks, supra note 128, at 2.
170. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Warrant Re-
purchase and Disposition Process for the Capital Purchase Program (June 26,
2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg-06262oog.html ("The President
has clearly stated that his objective is to dispose of the government's investments
in individual companies as quickly as is practicable.").





ket value."I72 This scrupulously balanced process at least in part reflects the
CPP's market structure, which gave the Treasury powerful incentives to devise a
process that banks would regard as reasonable and fair.
The process proceeds as follows. First, the bank must propose a price based
on the opinion of an independent investment firm. The Treasury then has ten
days to accept or reject, which it does by performing its own modeling and con-
sulting with outside investment advisors. If the Treasury rejects the bank's offer,
the parties then have ten days to reach an agreement, at which point either par-
ty can invoke an Appraisal Procedure. If either party invokes this procedure,
each party chooses an independent appraiser, and the two appraisers have thirty
days to agree on a fair market price. If they are unable to agree, the parties by
mutual consent appoint a third appraiser, and the average of the three apprais-
als is then binding on both the Treasury and the bank. The bank, however, is
not bound to repurchase the warrants and can walk away at any time. The bank
can then restart the process at any time, assuming that the Treasury has not sold
the warrants to a third party in the meantime."'
Because the underlying shares of the warrants for private banks are not
publicly traded, the standard SPA treats them somewhat differently. The SPA
prices private bank warrants at so.oi per share and prices the underlying shares
such that, when exercised, they total five percent of the Treasury's non-warrant
investment in the bank. The Treasury has a policy of exercising these private
bank warrants immediately upon receiving them. Thus, if a private bank wishes
to redeem its warrants, it must simply buy back the shares.'74
If a bank elects not to repurchase its warrants, the Treasury remains free to
exercise them or to sell them to a third party.' 5 Treasury officials have stated
that, in accordance with its policy of disposing of the warrants as soon as possi-
ble, the Treasury will auction off any warrants that a bank does not redeem
within six months after the bank repurchases its CPP-preferred shares."' As of
June 30, 2oo, thirty-seven public institutions had repurchased their warrants
for a total of $2.9 billion, and eleven private banks had repurchased the shares
172. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Securities Purchase Agreement: Standard Terms,
§ 4.9(c)(ii), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/spa.pdf (last visited Dec.
10, 2010).
173. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 151, at
15-16.
174. Id. at 16-17.
175. Id. at 17.
176. This willingness to resort to an auction has led some observers to question why
Treasury bothered to use an elaborate negotiation process with public banks-
that is, why it does not simply use auctions to dispose of all of its warrants. See
Simon Johnson, No Way Out: Treasury and the Price of TARP Warrants, THE
BASELINE SCENARIO (June 29, 2009 6:58 AM), http:/Ibaselinescenario.com/20091
o6/29/no-way-out-treasury-and-the-price-of-tarp-warrants/.
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underlying their warrants for a total of $3.8 million.'" The Treasury had also
auctioned off the warrants of thirteen institutions that had chosen not to repur-
chase their warrants directly, raising a total of $1.4 billion.'7
V. ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CPP
The aspiration of administrative law has been described as the search for
"institutional designs that appropriately balance the simultaneous demands of
political responsiveness, efficient administration, and respect for legal rights."'79
These competing values may be served by a variety of accountability mechan-
isms, including judicial review, congressional specification of statutory man-
dates, presidential control over administrative bureaucracies, internal mana-
gerial techniques, and market-based mechanisms. A given accountability
mechanism may be primarily oriented towards only one of the competing val-
ues, but accountability mechanisms often promote more than one value simul-
taneously. Judicial review, for example, is primarily concerned with the protec-
tion of legal rights, but it can also operate to serve efficiency and democratic
oversight as well. In the case of the CPP, as the foregoing description of the ac-
tual operation of the program makes clear, some of these types of accountability
mechanisms-judicial review and statutory specificity-were almost entirely
absent, while others-managerial and market-based mechanisms-played a
crucial role in the program's administration. The administrative success of the
CPP can be traced to the fact that the program's structure and the surrounding
political environment were such that the values of efficiency, rights protection,
and democratic control were generally aligned. Measures designed to get the
program up and running quickly and to send a clear, consistent, calming mes-
sage to the banking industry also tended to protect the legal rights of applicant
and participating banks, as well as to facilitate democratic oversight and con-
trol. It is for this reason that managerial and market-based accountability me-
chanisms-techniques that are usually oriented primarily towards administra-
tive efficiency-proved adequate to deliver crisis governance comporting with
the basic requirements of the rule of law.
Managerial accountability mechanisms played an especially critical role in
the administration of the CPP. In fact, the initial decision to make the CPP an
equity purchase program rather than an asset purchase program was essentially
an internal bureaucratic decision based primarily on concerns about adminis-
trative efficiency. As Interim Assistant Treasury Secretary Neel Kashkari ex-
plained to Congress, an asset purchase program would simply have taken too
177. SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 23, at 76.
178. Id. at 78-79.




long to implement.' That choice also had the effect, however, of serving dem-
ocratic control, as it would have been nearly impossible for elected representa-
tives to keep tabs on thousands of separate asset purchase transactions.
Beyond this initial design choice, moreover, the internal structures the
Treasury established to run the equity purchase program also served multiple
administrative values. The CPP was a large program, involving thousands of
applications and more than $20o billion distributed through more than seven
hundred transactions in less than fifteen months."' Delegation was an opera-
tional necessity, and in order to control the discretion that the Treasury dele-
gated to FBAs, and that senior FBA officials delegated to their subordinates,
consistent policies and guidelines reflecting stable, impersonal norms had to be
developed. Senior officials then enforced these guidelines through hierarchical
review procedures and assessments by the agencies' inspectors general." But
these written guidelines did more than promote efficient administration. They
also facilitated democratic control by enabling oversight bodies like the Con-
gressional Oversight Panel and SIGTARP to analyze and publicize the Trea-
sury's policies, and they promoted the protection of legal rights by forcing offi-
cials to treat all applicant banks according to the same articulated standards.
Similar managerial concerns also underlay the Treasury's decision not to nego-
tiate individually with each participating bank, but rather to use standardized
SPAs that banks could either take or leave.8 3 Standardized public SPAs simulta-
neously avoided the administrative headache of negotiating hundreds of sepa-
rate deals, sent a clear signal to banks, apprised them of their legal rights, and
informed elected officials and the public of exactly what the Treasury was
doing.
The market-based structure of the CPP was also instrumental in ensuring
accountability and adherence to the basic requirements of the rule of law. With
the exception of the first nine transactions, the Treasury had to obtain each
bank's consent for purchasing an equity stake, thereby protecting banks'
rights.'81 Written contracts gave banks notice of their obligations and severely
limited the Treasury's ability to come back later and change the terms of the
deal. In order to impose new obligations not contained in the original contract,
as the Treasury appears to want to do through the new Community Develop-
i8o. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Interim Assistant Secretary Neel
Kashkari Remarks on Implementation of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1281.htm.
181. SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 39.
182. See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text (discussing the delegation structure
for application processing); supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the delegation structure for compliance monitoring); supra notes 155-163 and
accompanying text (discussing the delegation structure for allowing repayment).
183. See supra Section IV.B.
184. See supra Sections IV.A-B.
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ment Funding Initiative and Small Business Lending Fund, the Treasury must
negotiate a new contract, which banks may refuse to sign.85 The market struc-
ture of the CPP also had the effect of promoting efficient administration, as it
encouraged the banks that most needed capital injections to come forward and
apply first. A preliminary academic study indicates that earlier rounds of CPP
funding did in fact go to the banks that needed it most-early participating
banks suffered the largest capital shocks and, once they received CPP funding,
experienced the largest excess returns."'
This is not to deny that politics also played an important role in the admin-
istration of the CPP. Given TARP's notoriety as a public program and the high
priority that both the Bush and Obama Administrations attached to rehabilitat-
ing the banking sector, the agencies implementing the CPP had strong political
reasons to ensure that the program ran efficiently and effectively. Congress also
created three new bodies to help provide oversight over the Treasury's imple-
mentation of TARP, and while the Financial Stability Oversight Board has been
largely missing-in-action, the Congressional Oversight Panel and SIGTARP
have established themselves as important public agencies." Much of the re-
search for this Note has come from reports prepared by these bodies,'" and they
have often played the role of political entrepreneurs, publicizing perceived
weaknesses and flaws in TARP and drawing on public sentiments to build their
institutional legitimacy and gain leverage over the Treasury.
Contra Posner and Vermeule, however, politics have not been the primary
driving force behind accountable crisis governance in the CPP. Indeed, when
Congress has responded to the political winds and tinkered with the adminis-
tration of the CPP, it has meddled with banks' rights and harmed the program's
effectiveness. Most notably, after the program was up and running and many
banks had already signed contracts with the Treasury, Congress through ARRA
imposed significant retroactive restrictions on how banks receiving TARP funds
may compensate their senior executives. Whatever one believes about the pro-
priety of tighter regulation of executive compensation in general, this statutory
restriction made little sense for the CPP. In fact, since the CPP was specifically
designed to attract healthy banks, the statutory restrictions had the effect of pu-
nishing many executives who had run their institutions responsibly. By mixing
coercive and arguably punitive restrictions into a voluntary program designed
to recapitalize the banking system, the ARRA executive compensation provi-
sions decreased participation in the CPP and pushed firms to exit the program
before they were financially ready. The Treasury has faithfully implemented
185. See SIGTARP, JULY 2010 REPORT, supra note 13, at 85-86.
186. Bayazitova & Shivdasani, supra note ag, at 3.
187. Joshua Ruby, Note, Sound and Fury, Confused Alarms and Oversight: Congress Del-
egation, and Effective Responses to Financial Crises, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 209, 227-
29 (2010).
i88. E.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 151;




these provisions, but its assignment of enforcement responsibility to the SEC
and its support for ditching executive compensation restrictions in the Small
Business Lending Fund indicates that the Treasury realizes that these restric-
tions are in tension with the CPP's larger goals. Politics' effect on the adminis-
tration of the CPP has been far more ambiguous than that of other accountabil-
ity mechanisms.
Alternative accountability mechanisms are thus primarily responsible for
the CPP's administrative success. The atmosphere of crisis eviscerated the pow-
er of the traditional mechanisms of statutory specificity and judicial review, and
politics' ability to promote consistent governance in accordance with the rule of
law has been mixed at best. Where the values of administrative efficiency, rights
protection, and democratic oversight are aligned, the CPP demonstrates that
alternative accountability mechanisms can be powerful indeed.
CONCLUSION
The CPP is a very large and important public program, but it has been un-
der-analyzed in the legal academic literature. The foregoing analysis of the inner
administrative workings of the program shows that what little has been written
thus far may be misplaced in its focus. While the executive compensation regu-
lations have received much public attention, they are in many ways anomalous
and separate from the program's central thrust. Moreover, while the authority
Congress delegated to the Treasury through EESA is quite broad and the provi-
sions on judicial review quite weak, the Treasury has nevertheless exercised its
discretion in a manner that has promoted all of the basic goals of administrative
governance.
The pivotal role that managerial and market-based accountability played in
the CPP underlines the importance of alternative accountability mechanisms in
administrative governance in general, especially when the dynamics of crisis
render traditional techniques like statutory specificity and judicial review inef-
fective. The Treasury, Congress, and other oversight bodies would do well to
bear these alternative mechanisms in mind as they consider the institutional de-
sign of the new Small Business Lending Fund and any other future programs
modeled on the CPP. More broadly, the lessons of the CPP suggest that scholars
and practitioners of administrative law should pay careful attention to how the
various goals of administrative governance-efficiency, rights protection, and
political responsiveness-do or do not align in any particular administrative
scheme. The extent of such alignment will often determine which accountability
mechanisms will actually add value. Where these values run orthogonal to one
another, all of the traditional mechanisms-statutory specificity, judicial re-
view, presidential supervision, etc.-may be necessary to secure responsible,
public-regarding administration. But where, as in the case of the CPP, these
values run parallel to one another, alternative accountability mechanisms may
suffice, and the addition of further mechanisms may simply serve to gum up the
works. One can also imagine a spectrum of intermediate cases of partial align-
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ment in which alternative mechanisms could compensate for weaknesses in, ra-
ther than the absence of, traditional accountability techniques.
In the case of the CPP, near-perfect alignment enabled a vague statute and
weak judicial review to serve the cause of successful crisis administration. If
Congress had made EESA's provisions more specific and subjected the Trea-
sury's actions to intensive judicial review, the Treasury might have been forced
to implement TARP as an asset purchase program and might never have been
able to create a much-needed capital injection program like the CPP. Statutory
specificity and effective judicial review would also almost certainly have delayed
the Treasury's actions for weeks if not months. In the absence of such measures,
internal managerial controls and the market-based structure of the program
permitted the Treasury-still subject to effective democratic control and res-
pectful of banks' rights-to implement the CPP quickly and effectively.
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